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SECURITIES LEGISLATION-LIMITATIONS UPON THE SCOPE OF RULE X-lOB-5
-A syndicate attempted to acquire all of the outstanding stock in a bridge
corporation pursuant to a plan to transfer the stock to a bridge commission
and realize substantial returns. The price offered for the stock was well
over the market price but the resale plan was not disclosed. After control
of 80 percent of the stock was obtained, the syndicate's purchasing agents
were installed as officers and directors. They continued to purchase the
stock without revealing the plan and the anticipated profits.1 Upon the
completion of the plan, former stockholders in the corporation brought a
class action against the syndicate members alleging a violation of rule
X-lOB-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission because of the failure
of the defendants to disclose the intention to resell. On defendants' motion
for summary judgment, held, motion granted. The scheme was conceived
and prosecuted by outsiders upon whom there was no duty of disclosure.
Further, no such duty arose when defendants achieved control of the
corporation since they gained no new information by virtue of achieving
this position. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 753.
Rule X-l0B-5, formulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1942, prohibits fraud by any person in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.2 This broad language, coupled with the possibility of

1 The complicated transaction is described at length in Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol
Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A. (2d) 201 (1952).
2 SEC Release No. 3230, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Serv. 1125,375 (1942): "It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
" (2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact _or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
" (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."
The rule was promulgated pursuant to §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 48 Stat. L. 891, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78 (j).

1956]

RECENT DECISIONS

1187

civil recovery, 3 has provoked a great deal of litigation in recent years.4
By reading limitations into the rule, however, the courts have considerably
narrowed its potential scope. For example, the more remote implications
are eliminated by requiring "a semblance of privity" between the parties.5
Although this limitation has been severely criticized as unwarranted by
authority, 6 inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts, 7 and
unfortunate because of the archaic and ambiguous nature of the term
"privity," 8 it appears to be firmly established.9 However, it is unlikely
that strict privity of contract is necessary. Reliance upon a misrepresentation by a person whom the defendant intended to mislead should be
sufficient to create liability.10 In any event, the requirement cannot be
found in the language of the rule. The most troublesome area covered
by rule X-IOB-5 is that of non-disclosure of pertinent information by
corporate "insiders."11 The leading case holds that it is unlawful for an
insider to purchase stock without disclosing material facts affecting its
value known to him by virtue of his inside position. 12 In the principal
case, the court draws negative inferences from this statement and uses it
to set the boundaries of recovery. Thus, only insiders are under a duty
to disclose and the information must be gained by virtue of their inside
position. This dubious reasoning does violence to the rule in that it makes
it applicable to far fewer persons than the phrase "any person" indicates.13
Nevertheless, the considerations behind this result are highly practical.
Realizing the speculative nature of stock transactions and the necessary
differences of opinion between buyer and seller, the principal case allows
interference only where the parties are not at arm's length, i.e., where
s The leading case recognizing such recovery is Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
(D.C. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 512 (motion to dismiss), (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 798 (on
the merits), (D.C. Pa. 1947) 83 F. Supp. 613 (requests for additional findings). See 14
UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 471 (1947). The implications of the Kardon case are analyzed in Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1052 (1951).
4 See, generally, 59 YALE L. J. 1120 (1950).
5 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 701
at 706, alfd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 883.
6 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Frank in the court of appeals decision in Joseph
v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., note 5 supra. See also 4 STAN. L. REv. 308
(1952).
7 See 4 STAN. L. REv. 308 at 311 (1952); 32 TEX. L. REv. 197 at 207 (1953). The question is also discussed in Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1064, n. 404 (1951; Supp. 1955).
s See Latty, "The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation under the S.E.C. Statutes," 18 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 505 at 520 (1953).
9 See Donovan Inc. v. Taylor, (D.C. Cal. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 552, for a recent decision
recognizing the privity requirement.
10 To this effect, see Latty, "The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a
Close Corporation under the S.E.C. Statutes,'' 18 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 505 at 520 (1953).
11 See Loss, SECURmES REGULATION 824 (1951). There has been much comment on this
question. See e.g.: 39 CALIF. L. REv. 429 (1951); 40 MINN. L. REv. 62 (1955).
12 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808. For a history of the
Transamerica litigation, see 54 MICH. L. REv. 971 (1956).
13 See 44 Iu.. L. REv. 841 (1949), for a discussion of the meaning of "any person."
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there is an unfair advantage taken by one because of his access to information.14 The necessity for such a strained interpretation results from the
sweeping, all-inclusive language of rule X-IOB-5. The principal case
illustrates a process by which the rule is being cut down to manageable
proportions. Liability is still recognized in cases containing traditional
elements such as privity or fiduciary relationship. To extend it beyond
those limits, a more precise statement than rule X-IOB-5 will be necessary.
Cyril Moscow

14 Principal

case at 764.

